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CHAPTER I 
INCOME REQUIREMENTS IN  
FAMILY REUNIFICATION REGIMES 
CONTENT: 1. Introduction. – 2. The European Family Migration Framework. – 3. Income Require-
ments in Family Reunification Law and the Male Breadwinner Model. – 4. Limitations of an An-
ti-Stereotyping Understanding of Equality for Migrant Women’s Access to Family Reunification. 
– 4.1. The ECtHR’s Approach to Racial and Ethnic Stereotypes in Family Migration Law. – 4.2. 
Limited Potential of the Anti-Stereotyping Approach with Respect to Substantive Equality in the 
Field of Family Life. – 5. The Capabilities Approach and Migrant Women’s Equal Access to 
Family Reunification. – 6. Income Requirements Under the Scrutiny of Domestic Courts. – 7. 
Concluding Remarks. 
1. Introduction 
In the European legal space, third-country national migrant women are not 
immune to the broader problem of unequal distribution of care and housework 
burdens between sexes. 1 They disproportionately bear the burden of unpaid care 
work within the household in comparison to migrant men. At the same time, in 
comparison to citizen women, they have fewer resources to rely on in order to al-
leviate such a burden. Moreover, as foreigners, they have restricted or no access to 
social assistance services. Living in a foreign country also prevents many migrants 
from enjoying the support of family networks that would be generally available in 
the country of origin. 2 
Migrant women can carry out such reproductive work exclusively or in combi-
nation with paid employment outside of the household. They share citizen wom-
 
 
1 European Institute for Gender Equality, Gender Equality Index – Time, 2013 <http://eige.eu 
ropa.eu/gender-statistics/gender-equality-index/2012/domain/time> accessed 26 July 2016. 
2 Fabrizio Bernardi and others ‘The Recent Fast Upsurge of Immigrants in Spain and Their Em-
ployment Patterns and Occupational Attainment’ (2011) 49 International Migration 148, 167. 
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en’s difficulties in balancing care and work responsibilities, 3 and they experience 
with particular intensity the current European wage gap between men and wom-
en 4 because they concentrate in the lowest paid sectors of host countries’ labour 
market. 5 
There is no doubt that the imposition of rigid economic thresholds as a neces-
sary requirement to enjoy family life with one’s children raises equality issues. The 
specific difficulties experienced by migrant women in satisfying these prerequisites 
relate to aspects of gender inequality such as labour market segregation, wage gap, 
disproportionate care burdens within the household, and so forth. At the same 
time, such difficulties also relate to their being foreigners and migrants, with lim-
ited possibilities to rely on family networks or social assistance services in order to 
alleviate these hurdles. 
A central question with respect to migrant women’s family life, then, concerns 
which notion of equality is best equipped to effectively respond to such difficul-
ties. There is no univocal understanding of sex equality within Europe. The EC-
tHR jurisprudence itself adopts shifting interpretations of equality and non-
discrimination. It is therefore not surprising that state practice within the Europe-
an Union is very heterogeneous. This chapter will critically review different no-
tions of equality currently enforced in the European legal space, resonating on 
their potential and shortcomings for migrant women’s specifically. In doing so, it 
will touch upon two main critical aspects of European family reunification law. 
First, in some cases EU and domestic norms in this realm embrace stereotypical 
and heavily gendered notions concerning migrant women’s role within the family. 
These stereotypes can relate, for instance, to the distribution of productive and re-
productive work within immigrant families and to women’s aspirations and choic-
es in this realm, or to normative expectations concerning the quality and type of 
their unpaid care work within the household. The normative embrace of such ste-
reotypes – and their enforcement by implementing authorities – turns them into 
legal prerequisites to enjoy the fundamental right to family life in the host country 
by accessing family reunification. As a result, migrant women who fail to comply 
with these stereotypical notions are discriminated against in their enjoyment of 
such a fundamental right. 
 
 
3 According to a research commissioned by the European Union Programme for Employment 
and Solidarity, women and particularly mothers are significantly more likely than men to work in 
part-time jobs and to reduce working hours in order to take care of young children (Rand Europe, 
Gender Equality in the Workforce: Reconciling Work, Private and Family Life in Europe, April 2014, 
8-10, <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-equality/files/documents/140502_gender_equality_work 
force_ssr_en.pdf> accessed 24 July 2016). 
4 European Institute for Gender Equality, Gender Equality Index – Money, 2013 <http://eige. 
europa.eu/gender-statistics/gender-equality-index/2012/domain/money/1> accessed 24 July 2016. 
5 Elisabeth Robert ‘A Gender Perspective on Migration, Remittances and Development: the UN-
INSTRAW Experience’. 
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Second, indirect discrimination against migrant women can stem from a norma-
tive de-valuation of unpaid care work within the household by family reunification 
regimes. When the performance of productive work is considered by the letter of 
the law or by implementing authorities as a more deserving activity, or even as the 
sole gateway, for the purpose of enjoying fundamental rights in the field of family 
life, migrant women who carry out reproductive work are automatically disadvan-
taged. While in certain circumstances such a differential treatment may be reason-
ably justified, it is crucial to enquire on whether this is always the case in relation 
to certain rules of family reunification. 
In the light of these issues, this chapter focuses on the disparate impact of EU 
and domestic family reunification law on migrant women who are carers of family 
members, especially children. It discusses whether and to what extent the discrim-
inatory effects of certain norms of family reunification law have been revealed and 
corrected by supranational and domestic courts, and enquires on which role – if 
any – has been played by human and fundamental rights in this area. 
In order to do so, it will first critically review the main sources of secondary EU 
law that regulate third-country nationals’ access to family reunification. Critical 
aspects for migrant women’s equal enjoyment of their right to family life in the 
host country, both as incoming family members and as prospective sponsors of 
family reunification, will be highlighted. Then, a specific attention will be paid to 
the discriminatory effects of the legal imposition of income requirements as a pre-
condition to sponsor family reunification, and the indirect discrimination that such 
an emphasis produces on migrant women specifically. 
After this analysis, this chapter will proceed to assess which judicial approaches 
and interpretations are best equipped to foster courts’ awareness, recognition and 
correction of these discriminatory effects. A specific attention will be paid to the 
eventual role played by human and fundamental rights in fostering a valorisation 
of unpaid care work as a sufficiently valid ground to access sponsorship of family 
reunification. First, it will discuss the strengths and limitations of the anti-stereo-
typing approach currently embraced by the ECtHR to ensure migrant women’s 
substantive equality in the field of family life. Second, interpretations carried out 
in this area by domestic courts within Italian, Spanish and British jurisdictions will 
be analysed. This examination will unveil the potential of a judicial consideration 
of migrant women’s capabilities as well as their broader relational contexts as a 
tool to ensure their substantive equality in respect to family reunification. 
2. The European Family Migration Framework 
EU family migration law is currently characterized by a questionable reliance 
on a one breadwinner model that not only fails to accurately capture the current 
6 The Human Rights of Migrant Women in International and European Law 
structure of many immigrant families, but also implicitly endorses a heavily gen-
dered distribution of reproductive and productive work within the household. If 
one indeed considers that migrant women still dominate family migration fluxes, 6 
it appears clearly that the one breadwinner model enforced by EU family migra-
tion law is actually a male breadwinner model. 7 
First and foremost, several legal sources in this field require settled migrants 
who pursue to sponsor family reunification to show their capability of financially 
supporting their family members by themselves. Focusing on family reunification 
between spouses, it is possible to recall that Art. 7 of Directive 2003/86/EC 8 on 
the right to family reunification of third-country nationals allows Member States to 
require, among other things, that the sponsor has “stable and regular resources 
which are sufficient to maintain himself/herself and the members of his/her family, 
without recourse to the social assistance system of the Member State concerned”. 9 
Only at the time of renewal of the family members’ residence permits, does Art. 
16(1)(a) of Directive 2003/86 establish that “the Member State shall take into ac-
count the contributions of the family members to the household income”. Even in 
this case, this possibility is envisaged only when the sponsor is unable to comply 
with these income requirements alone. 
The described economic requirements also apply to long-term residents’ family 
members entering the Member State where their sponsor resides, pursuant Art. 
16(5) of Directive 2003/109/EC 10 as well as to family members of highly qualified 
workers holding permits in accordance with the so-called Blue Card Directive. 11 
The only source in this context that at least acknowledges that family members 
may be able to support themselves financially at the time of their first entry in their 
host country is Art. 16(4)(c) of Directive 2003/109. This provision regulates the 
 
 
6 Eurostat, First Permits by Reason of Age, Sex and Citizenship, last updated on 08/12/2015, 
available at <http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/products-datasets/-/migr_resfas> accessed 19 April 
2016. Specifically on the United Kingdom, see Scott Blinder Non-European Migration to the UK: 
Family and Dependents, COMPAS (Oxford University March 2016). 
7 On the notion of the male breadwinner model, see Jane Lewis ‘Gender and the Development of 
Welfare Regimes’ (1992) 3 Journal of European Social Policy 159; Jane Lewis ‘The Decline of the 
Male Breadwinner Model: the Implications for Work and Care’ (2001) 8 Social Politics 152. 
8 Council Directive 2003/86/EC on The Right to Family Reunification [2003] OJ L251/12 (here-
inafter Directive 2003/86). 
9 Ibid. 7(1)(c). 
10 Council Directive 2003/109/EC of 25 November 2003 concerning the status of third-country 
nationals who are long-term residents [2003] OJ L16/44.  
11 Council Directive 2009/50/EC on The Conditions of Entry and Residence of Third-Country 
National for the Purposes of highly Qualified Employment [2009] OJ L155/17 (hereinafter Blue 
Card Directive). Art. 15 of the Blue Card Directive grants third-country nationals holding this permit 
with the right to family reunification as envisaged by Directive 2003/86 with several more favourable 
derogations that do not touch upon income requirements 
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very specific case in which long-term residents are accompanied by their family 
members – already residing in the Member State in accordance with Directive 
2003/86 – when exercising their right to reside in a second Member State. 12 In this 
case, family members will still need to apply for a residence permit in the second 
Member State, but Art. 16(4)(c) explicitly refers to the possibility that income re-
quirements established at domestic level in this context may be satisfied by family 
members themselves rather than by the sponsor. It indeed states that the second 
Member State may require, among other conditions, family members to provide 
“evidence that they have stable and regular resources to maintain themselves with-
out recourse to the social assistance of the Member State concerned or that the 
long-term resident has such resources and insurance for them”. In sum, Directive 
2003/109 is the only legal source actually envisaging the possibility that family 
members may be able to support themselves from the very beginning of their 
movement rather than relying on their sponsor for subsistence, although exclusive-
ly in the case of movement of the long-term resident sponsor in another Member 
State. On the other hand, Directive 2003/86 – which still constitutes the general 
legal framework on third-country national’s enjoyment of family unity – is heavily 
based on a one breadwinner model, whereby Member States may reasonably re-
quire sponsors to support their whole families by themselves. 
Second, the discretional power left to Member States in relation to the possibility 
to limit access to the labour market for family members also reinforces the described 
normative embrace of a male breadwinner model. Art. 14(2) of Directive 2003/86, 
in particular, leaves Member States free to determine the conditions under which 
family members can exercise employed or self-employed activities. Furthermore, it 
allows Member States to prevent family members (and thus spouses) of third-
country national sponsors from performing said activities for the first year of their 
stay according to “the situation of their labour market”. The restrictive character of 
these rules is evident when compared to Directive 2004/38 on the right to free 
movement of Union citizens. 13 This source provides that family members of Union 
citizens who have the right of residence in a Member State “shall be entitled to take 
up employment or self-employment there” irrespective of their nationality. 
 
 
12 Art. 16 of the Directive establishes a distinction between family members depending on whether 
the family was already constituted in the first Member State or not. In the latter case, Art. 16 (5) entirely 
refers to the rules established by Directive 2003/86. In the former case, Art. 16(1) establishes an obliga-
tion for the second Member State to authorise spouses and minor children – as defined by article 4(1) 
of Directive 2003/86 – to accompany or join the long-term resident, while the admission of other rela-
tives is left by Art. 16(2) to the discretional power of the second Member State. 
13 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on The Right of Citizens 
of the Union and Their Family Members to Move and Reside Freely Within the Territory of the 
Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 64/221/EEC, 
68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 90/365/EEC and 
93/96/EEC [2004] OJ L158/77 (hereinafter Directive 2004/38). 
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3. Income Requirements in Family Reunification Law and the Male 
Breadwinner Model 
The described legal framework suggests a normative view of third-country na-
tionals entering and residing in the EU on the grounds of residence permits issued 
for the purpose of family reunification as mere commodities of their sponsor, and 
as passive followers rather than as individuals with their own life plans and aspira-
tions beyond the family realm. 14 In relation to this, the normative model of family 
that shines through the discussed legal provisions is one based on a rigid distinc-
tion between productive work – a task that sponsors are expected to carry out ex-
clusively – and reproductive work – assigned to family members. 
Because third-country nationals entering through family reunification schemes 
are still disproportionally women, this model carries heavily gendered implications 
and in fact undermines migrant women’s equality. Such a male breadwinner model 
is discriminatory because it enforces a stereotypical and dated view of migrant 
women’s families. This view negatively and disproportionally affects their freedom 
of choice in relation to productive and reproductive work, and forces them in a 
situation of socio-economic dependence. Allowing Member States to exclude a 
group mostly made up by migrant women from the national labour market, thus 
confining them in the private realm of the family, hampers their integration in the 
host country and increases their isolation. These legislative choices push migrant 
women towards performing unpaid care work within the household and limit their 
freedom of choice in this realm. As a result, “the right to family (re)unification is 
primarily construed as a right to reproduction”. 15 
In this light, a contradiction within EU migration law emerges in respect to the 
role of holders of family reunification permits within their household. On the one 
hand, the possibility to exclude family members from the labour market during 
their initial stay pushes the latter towards unpaid care work within the household, 
while their sponsor carries out paid employment – along the lines of a rigid divi-
sion of reproductive and productive work. In the light of the strong feminisation 
of family migration fluxes, the gendered character of such a division is apparent. 
On the other hand, the exclusive or predominant performance of unpaid care 
work within the household is discouraged among prospective sponsors, since 
Member States may well require the latter to show sufficient financial resources to 
support all of their reunited family members by themselves. 
 
 
 14 Eleonore Kofman and others, ‘Migrant and Minority Women, Inequalities and Discrimination 
in the Labour Market’ in Karen Kraal and others (eds) Equal Opportunities and Ethnic Inequalities in 
European Labour Markets: Discrimination, Gender and Politics of Diversity (Amsterdam University 
Press 2009) 63.  
15 Elisabeth Strasser and others, ‘Doing Family’ (2009) 14 The History of Family 165, 174.  
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On a broader level, economic requirements alone are disproportionally difficult 
to satisfy for migrant women. Especially in Southern Europe, the wage gap gener-
ally observable between citizens and non-citizens is indeed significantly wider for 
migrant women than for migrant men. 16 It is therefore harder for the former to 
comply with fixed economic thresholds. Moreover, the unequal distribution of 
care burdens between men and women also affects migrant families, with the ag-
gravating factor of often being unable to rely on kin networks or accessible child-
care in the host country. Such care burdens also undermine migrant women’s ca-
pability to earn an income. Therefore, domestic family reunification rules that put 
a strong emphasis on economic thresholds as a precondition to sponsor family re-
unification produce a disparate impact on migrant women’s enjoyment of their 
right to family life in their host countries. 
Beyond Member States’ individual choices in relation to their migration poli-
cies, the wide discretional power left to them in this field by EU family migration 
law 17 is problematic in itself. The low standards established at EU level in respect 
of financial preconditions to enjoy the right to family reunification allow for an 
uneven and heterogeneous regulation of family reunification within Europe. 
The domestic jurisdictions examined in this book mirror such unevenness. On 
the one hand, the Italian and Spanish regime adopt a holistic view of migrant fami-
lies, allowing prospective sponsors to rely on the income of other family members 
in order to comply with financial prerequisites. In Italy, Art. 29(3)(b) of the so-
called Testo Unico Immigrazione (T.U.) specifically establishes that “for the pur-
pose of determining income the total yearly income of the family members living 
together with the person applying for family reunification must also be taken into 
consideration”. 18 In Spain, Art. 54(4) of Real Decreto (R.D.) 557/2011 19 includes 
 
 
16 For instance, on Italy see Daniela Piazzalunga ‘Is There a Double-Negative Effect? Gender 
and Ethnic Wage Differentials in Italy’ (2015) 29 Labour 243; OECD, Lavoro per gli Immigrati: 
l’Integrazione nel Mercato del Lavoro in Italia (OECD Publishing 2014)73 –75 <http://www.oecd. 
org/els/lavoro-per-gli-immigrati-9789264216570-it.htm> accessed 19 April 2016. On Spain, see Con-
cepción Carrasco Carpio ‘La Vulnerabilidad Laboral de los Extranjeros en España’ (2015) 8 Migra-
ciones Internacionales 41; Hipólito Simón Pérez and Inés Murillo Huertas ‘¿Sufren las Mujeres In-
migrantes una Doble Penalización Salarial? Evidencia Para España’ (2014) 87 Cuadernos Económi-
cos de ICE 85. 
17 The wide discretion enjoyed by Member States as to income requirements was also highlighted 
in the European Commission’s first report on the implementation of the Directive Commission, ‘Re-
port from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the Application of Di-
rective 2003/86/EC on the Right to Family Reunification’ COM (2008) 610 final, 14. 
18 Decreto legislativo of 25 July 1998, No. 286, G.U. No. 191 of 18 August 1998, S.O. No. 139. 
Art. 29(3)(b) of the T.U. requires sponsors to show availability of a yearly income at least equal to the 
yearly amount of welfare cheques (5865 Euros for 2016), plus half of this amount for each family 
member pursuing family reunification. 
19 Real Decreto 557/2011, de 20 de abril, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento de la Ley Orgánica 
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in this assessment also the income “brought by the sponsor’s spouse or partner, as 
well as by any other direct family member of first degree, provided that he or she 
resides in Spain and cohabits with the sponsor”. 20 In both domestic orders, it is 
however unclear whether prospective sponsors may entirely rely on the income of 
other family members or they must show a certain income of their own. It is also 
unclear whether the economic thresholds established by Spanish and Italian law 
may be interpreted with a certain flexibility by implementing authorities. 
The United Kingdom, on the other hand, envisages significantly stricter eco-
nomic prerequisites for prospective sponsors. First, the right to reunification with 
a non-EEA family member is restricted to British citizens, persons settled in the 
UK and skilled workers residing in the country under the Points Based System. 21 
Second, the financial requirements set by the British Immigration Rules 22 may not 
be satisfied by relying also on the income of others who live in the same house-
hold. 23 When applying this threshold, decision-makers may not exercise any dis-
cretion or flexibility. 24 The decision of the United Kingdom to opt out of Directive 
 
 
4/2000, sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en España y su integración social, tras su 
reforma por Ley Orgánica 2/2009. According to Art. 54(1), sufficient economic means amount to a 
monthly 150% of a fixed income index (the IPREM), plus 50% for each additional family member. 
Furthermore, Art. 54(2) establishes that residence permits for the purpose of family reunification 
“will not be issued if it is ascertained beyond any doubt that there is no prospect of maintaining the 
economic means during the year following the submission of the application”. This prospect “will be 
assessed by taking into consideration the evolution of the sponsor’s means for the six months preced-
ing the date of submission of the application”. 
20 Art. 18(2) of Ley Orgánica (hereinafter, L.O.) 4/2000 requires prospective sponsors to have 
“sufficient economic means to provide for his or her needs as well as those of his or her family, once 
reunited”. Pursuant the parameters established by Art. 54(1) of R.D. 557/2011, this sum for 2016 
amounts to a monthly income of roughly 785 Euros, plus around 261 Euros for each additional fami-
ly member for which reunification is pursued. 
21 The current Points Based System was introduced in 2008 and is based on three tiers. Tier 1 
targets highly skilled workers such as graduate entrepreneurs and investors, while Tier 2 concerns 
skilled workers, intra-corporate transferees, ministers of religion and sportspersons. Lastly, Tier 5 
targets various categories of temporary workers, including charity workers, creative and sporting 
workers, workers present under government authorised exchanges, international agreements and 
youth mobility schemes as well as religious workers. Tier 3, which had been envisaged to attract lim-
ited numbers of low-skilled workers to fill specific labour shortages, was never implemented. For an 
account of the Points Based System, see Georg Menz ‘Theorizing About Change: The Promise of 
Comparative Political Economy for Migration Studies’in Anna Amelina and others (eds) An Anthol-
ogy of Migration and Social Transformation: European Perspectives (Springer 2016), 51 –53. 
22 Immigration Act 1971, reformed by the Statement of Changes in the Immigration Rules 2012. 
S E-ECP.3.1. of the Act requires a gross annual income amounting at least to £ 18,600, plus addi-
tional sums in case of presence of non-EEA or non-settled children. 
23 See Immigration Directorate Instruction, Family Migration: Appendix FM Section 1.7, para 
4.2.1.  
24 Ibid para 3.2.1. 
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2003/86 may not be seen as an explanation for its restrictive family migration re-
gime. In fact, setting aside the mentioned restrictions as to their personal scope of 
application, the economic prerequisites established by its Immigration Rules would 
be perfectly in compliance with the standards set by the Directive. 
The existence of heterogeneous family reunification regimes within Europe raises 
the question of the proportionality of normative measures that impose income 
thresholds as a precondition for the enjoyment of this right regardless of the indi-
vidual circumstances and difficulties of prospective sponsors. More broadly, they 
involve the delicate balance of interests between the need for host states to ensure 
that incoming migrants will not excessively weigh on the national social assistance 
system and migrant families’ willingness to live together in the host country. An ex-
clusive focus on productive work and economic thresholds as the only way to satisfy 
preconditions for the enjoyment of family life in the host country bears dispropor-
tionate and negative effects on migrant women’s possibilities to access family reuni-
fication as sponsors. It may not be realistic, in this context, to argue in favour of a 
state obligation to grant access to family reunification regardless of the prospective 
sponsor’s financial resources. Nonetheless, the awareness that the balance of these 
interests may play out in a discriminatory way for migrant women is equally crucial, 
as it is to enquire on how to resolve this conflict while also ensuring respect of their 
right to equality and non-discrimination in relation to family life. 
The rest of this chapter is devoted to answer this question. It will do so by fo-
cusing on specific barriers to migrant women’s equal enjoyment of the right to 
family reunification and testing which interpretative approach is more likely to 
turn law and courts’ attention to such hurdles. 
4. Limitations of an Anti-Stereotyping Understanding of Equality for Mi-
grant Women’s Access to Family Reunification 
The issue of the compatibility of normative stereotypes with the principle of 
equality and non-discrimination has been extensively examined in the European 
Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) jurisprudence. The latter examined on multiple 
occasions domestic norms that more or less explicitly embraced and enforced a 
stereotypical model of family based on gendered distinctions between productive 
and reproductive work. 
One of its first decisions in this field, the landmark case of Abdulaziz, Cabales 
and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom, 25 concerned precisely normative and stereo-
 
 
25 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom (ECtHR) App no 9214/80, 9473/81 
and 9474/81 (28 May 1985) (hereinafter Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom). 
12 The Human Rights of Migrant Women in International and European Law 
typical assumptions concerning the role of migrant women within their families. 
Here, the ECtHR deemed the imposition of stricter conditions only to women 
aiming to sponsor reunification with their husbands or fiancés (and not to male 
prospective sponsors) as incompatible with Arts. 8 and 14 ECHR. The justification 
advanced by the British Government for this rule related to the need to “[protect] 
the labour market at a time of high unemployment by curtailing ‘primary im-
migration’, that is immigration by someone who could be expected to seek full-time 
work in order to support a family [emphasis added]”. 26 In the Government’s view, 
indeed, “men were more likely to seek work than women, with the result that male 
immigrants would have a greater impact than female immigrants” 27 on the nation-
al labour market. Such a justification was openly rejected as outdated and inexact 
by the ECtHR, which recalled that “the impact on the domestic labour market of 
women immigrants as compared with men ought not to be underestimated”. 28 In 
fact, even before the introduction of the 1980 Rules many migrant wives were eco-
nomically active. 29 
Nonetheless, there are limitations to the deployment of the ECtHR’s anti-
stereotyping approach in the field of migration. First, the ECtHR has shown a cer-
tain judicial resistance to identify and rebuke stereotypical justification on the 
grounds of race and ethnicity within migration law. Only recently has the ECtHR 
abandoned its reticence with its judgment of Biao v. Denmark. 30 Second, and more 
broadly, the potential of this approach with respect to certain instances of indirect 
discrimination is doubtful. The next two paragraphs will respectively explore these 
limitations. 
4.1. The ECtHR Approach to Racial and Ethnic Stereotypes in Family Migra-
tion Law 
Already in Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali, the ECtHR assessed that the im-
position of stricter conditions to obtain leave to remain in the United Kingdom 
exclusively to “non-patrials” 31 were not “racist in character”. 32 Their disparate 
 
 
26 Ibid 21. 
27 Ibid 75. 
28 Ibid 79. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Biao v. Denmark (ECtHR) App no 38590/10 (24 May 2016) (hereinafter Biao v. Denmark). 
31 For the purpose of the 1980 Immigration Rules, non-patrials were persons who neither were 
UK or Colonies citizens who had acquired citizenship at birth, adoption, naturalisation or registra-
tion in the British Islands (or were children or grandchildren of such persons) or who had been set-
tled in the British Islands for at least five years, nor were other Commonwealth citizens who were 
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impact on certain ethnic groups was simply due to the fact that “among those 
wishing to immigrate, some ethnic groups outnumbered others”. 33 
The judicial resistance by the ECtHR to rebuke stereotypical justification on 
the grounds of race and ethnicity within migration law was also observable in the 
2014 Chamber judgment of Biao v. Denmark. 34 This case concerned an exception 
to the so-called “attachment requirement” adopted by the Dutch 2000 Aliens Act. 
Pursuant this requirement, only couples whose ties with Denmark are stronger 
than those with any other country are admitted to family reunification. The excep-
tion, named the “28-year rule”, applies in case the prospective sponsor has been a 
Danish national for 28 years or is a non-Danish citizen who was born and/or 
raised in Denmark and has lawfully resided there for at least 28 years. Despite the 
presence of stereotypical justifications in the preparatory works to the Aliens 
Act, 35 the second section of the ECtHR deemed appropriate to frame the case at 
issue as one of differential treatment between persons who had been Danish na-
tionals for more than 28 years and persons who had been so for less than 28 years. 
As a result, it concluded that the lamented exclusion from the exemption was not 
disproportionate to the aim pursued, namely to exempt Danish nationals who 
“seen from a general perspective, had lasting and long ties with Denmark so that it 
would be unproblematic to grant family reunion with a foreign spouse because it 
would normally be possible for such spouse to be successfully integrated into Dan-
ish society”. 36 In their dissenting opinion, Judges Sajó, Vučinič and Kūris criti-
cised such a conclusion, observing that “the impugned differentiation [reflected 
and reinforced], albeit indirectly, a negative stereotype” 37 and concluding that the 
more favourable treatment granted to Danish citizens by blood was not a very 
weighty reason to justify such a discriminatory approach. 
The ECtHR’s carefulness in distinguishing between nationality and ethnicity as 
two different discrimination grounds, focusing on the former while setting aside 
the latter, suggests an unwillingness to restrict the margin of discretion left to 
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36 Ibid 106. 
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States Parties in the field of migration control. It has been rightly observed that the 
prioritisation of migration control in the European Union has also fostered “an ex-
treme caution about conflating race with nationality in the sense of allowing anti-
discrimination legislation to impact on nationality-based distinctions provided for 
by migration laws and policies”. 38 
In 2016, however, the Grand Chamber reversed the assessment of the second 
section, identifying a disparate impact of the rules at issue on Danish citizens of 
non-Danish ethnic origin. Despite the unavailability of statistics on the allegedly 
disproportional prejudicial effect of the 28-year rule on this group, it established 
that it could be reasonably assumed that Danish citizens born and raised in Den-
mark would be of Danish ethnic origin – while those who acquired citizenship lat-
er in life would be of foreign ethnic origin. Thus, the 28-year rule indirectly fa-
voured the former. 
The ECtHR observed that the aim of the 28-year rule – as emerging from its 
preparatory works – was to allow Danish expatriates to return to Denmark and 
obtain family reunification there. Moreover, the extension of the attachment re-
quirement to Danish citizens was justified in the preparatory works as a way to fos-
ter the integration of those among them who were originally of foreign extraction. 
In the Government’s view, indeed, the latter showed a tendency to marry persons 
from their country of origin, and this in turn allegedly hampered their integration. 
Recalling the principles established in Konstantin Markin, 39 the ECtHR rejected 
such justifications as stereotypical. These biased assumptions therefore could not 
justify the difference in treatment at the disadvantage of naturalised Danish citi-
zens. Since it was not possible to identify other very weighty reasons unrelated to 
race and ethnic origin, the ECtHR recognised a breach of Art. 14 in conjunction 
with Art. 8 ECHR. 
Despite this important development, it remains to be seen whether this newly 
found judicial awareness of the indirectly discriminatory effects of racial stereo-
types in family migration law will expand to instances of intersectional discrimina-
tion. In fact, in a series of inadmissibility decisions concerning transnational par-
ents’ access to family reunification with their children, the ECtHR enforced stereo-
typical notions concerning migrant families and parental roles within it. In particu-
lar, the ECtHR was repeatedly asked to assess whether the Dutch policy of rejec-
tion of family reunification applications – on the grounds that the involved chil-
dren no longer “actually [belonged] to the family unit” 40 – breached Art. 8 
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ECHR. A critical comparison between decisions concerning single mothers 41 and 
single fathers 42 in this context reveals an implicit enforcement by the ECtHR of 
stereotypical views of immigrant men and women’s parental duties and responsi-
bilities. Despite the fact that all of such claims were deemed inadmissible, only the 
decisions concerning single mothers included a detailed and ultimately negative 
assessment of aspects such as their decision to emigrate leaving young children be-
hind, the need of care of the latter, as well as the eventual opposition of a new 
partner to an earlier reunification. 43 
These features are also present in the recent inadmissibility decision of I.A.A. v. 
the United Kingdom, 44 where the ECtHR analysed the application of five Somali 
siblings – some of whom still minors – against the refusal of the United Kingdom 
to grant them entry in the State for the purpose of family reunification with their 
mother. In assessing whether the British Government had struck a fair balance of 
interests in the case at issue, the ECtHR focused on the question of whether the 
involved mother had always intended to have her children join her in the United 
Kingdom. In this context, it reprimanded her “conscious decision to leave her 
children in Somalia in order to join her new husband in the United Kingdom, 
knowing that he would not agree to the children joining them”. 45 The ECtHR did 
not accept the argumentation submitted by the applicants whereby the mother 
had left Ethiopia to flee an armed conflict, and framed her emigration as a choice 
to pursue a new relationship over enjoying family life with her children in Somalia. 
 
 
41 Knel and Veira v the Netherlands (ECtHR) App no 39003/97 (5 September 2000); P.R. v the 
Netherlands (ECtHR) App no 39391/98 (7 November 2000); I.M. v the Netherlands (ECtHR) App 
no 41226/98 (25 March 2003); Chandra and Others v the Netherlands (ECtHR) App no 53102/99 (13 
May 2003); Ramos Andrade v the Netherlands (ECtHR) App no 53675/00 (6 July 2004); Benamar and 
Others v the Netherlands (ECtHR) App no 43786/04 (5 April 2005). 
42 Ahmut v the Netherlands (ECtHR) App no 21702/93 (28 November 1996); Mensah v. the 
Netherlands (ECtHR) App no 47042/99 (9 October 2001); Lahnifi v the Netherlands (ECtHR) App 
no 39329/98 (13 February 2001); Adnane v the Netherlands (ECtHR) App no 50568/99 (6 Novem-
ber 2001). 
43 The only successful case in this context, Tuquabo-Tekle and others v. the Netherlands (ECtHR) 
App no 60665/00 (1 December 2005) does not undermine this conclusion. It is indeed true that in 
this case the ECtHR recognized a violation of a single transnational mother’s right to family life un-
der Art. 8 ECHR, establishing that the national authorities had “failed to strike a fair balance be-
tween the applicants’ interests on the one hand and [their] own interest in controlling immigration 
on the other” (Ibid 52). However, in doing so it did not abandon the described gendered and ab-
stract model of “good mother”. In fact, the ECtHR was able to reach this conclusion because the 
applicant mother involved in this case actually complied with such a model. She was a widow who 
had escaped a civil war in Ethiopia, who had experienced factual difficulties in knowing the wherea-
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Accordingly, her two-year wait after the separation from her second husband was 
not considered as motivated by the need to gather the necessary financial re-
sources to support a family reunification application for five children, but rather as 
a further indication of her lack of motivation. Lastly, the assessment of her reason-
able prospects to relocate to Ethiopia did not give a decisive weight to her degree 
of integration in the United Kingdom. 
In sum, the ECtHR has consistently rejected gender stereotypes concerning 
women’s role within the family. 46 However, it has done so exclusively in respect to 
citizen women, implicitly reaffirming them in the field of family migration. Family 
reunification implies a certain degree of scrutiny by implementing authorities and 
judicial organs in the private realm of the family. Nonetheless, the imposition of a 
gendered model of proper parent on migrant women alone produces discriminato-
ry effects on the intersecting grounds of sex, race/ethnic origin and migrant status. 
There is indeed no trace in the ECtHR jurisprudence of a similar model for immi-
grant fathers or for citizen women. 
The intersectional character of the stereotypical views enforced by the ECtHR 
is key to explain why migrant women have so far not benefited from the anti-
stereotyping notion of equality increasingly deployed by the ECtHR. Migrant 
women are placed at the intersection of many grounds of discrimination. This does 
not simply foster their socio-economic disadvantage, but it also influences the 
awareness and responsiveness of legislators and courts to such a disadvantage. 
More broadly, the ECtHR has so far shown a very limited engagement with issues 
of intersectional discrimination on the grounds of ethnic origin and gender, even 
beyond the issue of normative stereotyping. 47 In the cases of Osman v. Denmark 48 
and of C.N. and V. v. France, 49 for instance, the ECtHR recognised violations of 
ECHR rights but failed to capture the intersections of age, gender and ethnic 
origin that grounded the abuse suffered by the applicants. 50 
4.2. Limited Potential of the Anti-Stereotyping Approach with Respect to Sub-
stantive Equality in the Field of Family Life 
A second and more structural limitation of the ECtHR’s understanding of equali-
ty as an anti-stereotyping norm concerns its effectiveness in respect of certain in-
stances of indirect discrimination . Such an approach, indeed, is unequipped to cap-
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ture and correct discrimination that stems not from normative stereotyping, but 
from apparently neutral norms that fail to take into consideration the specific disad-
vantage of certain groups. Substantive sex equality, indeed, may require a different 
treatment of women – or of certain groups of women – in a different situation in or-
der to remedy a disadvantage disproportionally experienced by them. In fact, a strict 
anti-stereotyping approach can preclude the recognition of such a disadvantage by 
barring broad judicial claims concerning women’s needs and difficulties. 51 
These limitations have emerged in the few occasions where the ECtHR has 
dealt with claims concerning income requirements imposed by domestic laws as a 
precondition for the enjoyment of certain rights. The decision of Haydarie v. the 
Netherlands, 52 for instance, declared inadmissible a claim of violation of the right 
to family life under Art. 8 ECHR submitted by an Afghan woman against the deci-
sion of the Dutch authorities to deny her family reunification. Both the domestic 
authorities and the ECtHR assessed that the applicants’ specific situation, as the 
carer of her disabled sister who refused the aid of strangers, did not constitute a 
special circumstance that could grant an exception to the rules at issue. 
More recently, in the case of Garib v. the Netherlands, 53 the ECtHR established 
that the refusal of a housing permit to a Dutch woman (Ms Garib) due to her failure 
to meet income requirements constituted a proportionate measure and thus did not 
breach her freedom to choose her residence under Art. 2 of Prot. No. 4 ECHR. The 
ECtHR agreed with the Netherlands that Ms Garib’s situation did not allow for any 
exemption. 54 The dissenting opinion of Judges López Guerra and Keller, on the 
other hand, highlighted that the applicant in this case was a single mother of two 
children entirely relying on social welfare benefits. In their view, the discussed in-
come-based restriction did create “discrimination based on race and gender, since 
the people most gravely affected by unemployment are immigrants and single moth-
ers”. 55 They therefore assessed that the denial of a housing permit to Ms Garib was 
a measure neither necessary in a democratic society nor proportionate. 
In the discussed cases an anti-stereotyping understanding of equality could not 
have prompted a wholesome judicial consideration of the obstacles and difficulties 
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experienced by the applicants, as single mothers with no income of their own and 
significant care burdens. On the other hand, a judicial consideration of the influ-
ence of these factors on the applicants’ freedom of choice would have unveiled the 
indirectly discriminatory character of apparently neutral income requirements and 
prompted the ECtHR to consider possible violations of their right to substantive 
equality. These considerations point to the notions of equality as capability and of 
relational self, proposed within U.S. scholarship respectively by Martha Nussbaum 
and Jennifer Nedelsky. The next paragraph will examine the issue of migrant 
women’s access to sponsorship of family reunification in the light of this theoreti-
cal background. 
5. The Capabilities Approach and Migrant Women’s Equal Access to Fam-
ily Reunification 
In the field of family reunification, a capabilities approach would not lead to a 
complete exclusion of financial considerations from the balance of the interests in-
volved in decisions concerning admission to sponsorship. Similarly, it would not 
ensure the possibility for anyone to sponsor family reunification regardless of their 
capability to ensure decent standards of living to their incoming family members. 
Rather, it would support a judicial awareness of structural burdens affecting cer-
tain categories of prospective sponsors, encouraging as far as possible an extensive 
judicial interpretation of income requirements established by family migration law. 
This, in turn, can lead to the emergence of alternative models of “deserving spon-
sor” of family reunification, granting unpaid care work performed within the fami-
ly with the same value of productive work while also respecting States’ interest to 
protect their national social assistance systems. 
A judicial interpretation considering migrant women as legal subjects in con-
text rather than isolated individuals – and thus also as individuals whose freedom 
of choice and capability of self-determination is affected by relationships of care 
and responsibilities – is likely to foster a stronger judicial awareness of the dispar-
ate impact of norms that overlook their specific needs and difficulties. This is not 
to say that migrant women are exclusively devoted to reproductive work within 
the family. This argumentation should not be understood as a call for an exclusive 
judicial promotion of this type of activity at the disadvantage of other models, in-
cluding one of economically active migrant woman. Rather, in order to fully realize 
substantive equality in relation to the right to family life, courts should also take 
into account unpaid care work and the related responsibilities in order to realize 
that certain norms that link access to rights to compliance with a rigid breadwin-
ner model disproportionally and negatively affect women. Understood in this 
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sense, a judicial valorisation of unpaid care work as one of the possible gateways to 
access family reunification will benefit those devoted to this type of activity with-
out taking away rights and entitlements from those migrant women who perform 
productive work – and push courts to device alternative solutions to balance the in-
terests at play. In fact, such an approach is likely to benefit migrant women who as-
pire to sponsor family reunification regardless of whether they carry out unpaid care 
work, paid employment or a likely mixture of the two activities. The next section 
will further illustrate these points by critically reviewing meaningful judicial exam-
ples within the domestic jurisdictions of Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
Before moving on, however, it is important to clarify that considering migrant 
women in the context of their family relationships does not deny their individuality 
as legal subjects. The view proposed here does not share Nedelsky’s criticism of 
Nussbaum, concerning the latter’s supposed focus on the individualistic self. While 
it is true that Nussbaum emphasized the importance of considering the capabilities 
of each woman as an isolated entity, this proposition did not intend in my view to 
deny the centrality of her network of relationships and responsibilities. Rather, this 
choice stemmed from the consciousness that too often women had disappeared 
from the radar of social justice goals because they had been considered as fused 
with such networks rather than as individuals of their own. Let us consider, in this 
respect, Nussbaum’s observations concerning the family, whereby: 
“(…) all too often, women have been denied the basic goods of life because they 
have been seen as parts of an organic entity, such as the family is supposed to be, rather 
than as political subjects in their own right (…), as reproducers and caregivers, rather 
than as ends in themselves”. 56 
In fact, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach – by encouraging a stronger consid-
eration of the concrete circumstances that affect women’s freedom of choice –
inevitably pushes their relationships and care responsibilities to the foreground. 
One of her aims, indeed, was to enquire on how law and public policy shape and 
should shape families. In Nussbaum’s view, “the capabilities approach (…) actual-
ly provides the best framework within which both to value care and to give it the 
necessary scrutiny”, because it was “explicitly committed to a prominent place for 
love and care as important goals of social planning and as major moral abilities”. 57 
Disproportionate care burdens are still a reality for many migrant women, and the 
acknowledgment of this fact in judicial interpretation is crucial for the enjoyment 
of their right to family life in conditions of equality and non-discrimination. 
At the same time, one must be aware of the possible pitfalls of linking migrant 
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women’s enjoyment of human and fundamental rights to their performance of un-
paid care work within the household. Precisely because the aim of this proposed 
interpretative solution is to protect their right to equality and non-discrimination, 
it is crucial to avoid a consideration of reproductive work as the only gateway to 
the enjoyment of their right to family life. If that was the case, migrant women 
would be pushed into unpaid care work, with the result of narrowing their capa-
bilities of choice in this realm and of marginalizing those who carry out productive 
work outside of the household. 
6. Income Requirements Under the Scrutiny of Domestic Courts 
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, Italian and Spanish family reunifica-
tion laws allow prospective sponsors to rely on the income of other family mem-
bers who cohabit with them in order to comply with financial prerequisites estab-
lishes therein. Such provisions reveal an interesting relational consideration of 
sponsors in the broader contexts of their families, and in turn a holistic view of 
their families as a unit where every member contributes to the general well-being. 
These norms, however, leave unanswered the question of whether subjects entirely 
devoted to unpaid care work could be admitted to sponsor family reunification by 
relying on the income of other family members. 
Interestingly, this question was answered in the positive by Italian and Spanish 
courts even before the adoption of the current family migration schemes. In Spain, 
for instance, the Tribunal Superior de Justicia of Castilla y León 58 was asked to per-
form an extensive interpretation of Art. 18(2) of the L.O., which at the time only 
provided for the possibility to rely on the income of a cohabiting spouse. The ap-
plicant in this case was a Colombian mother of four with three different jobs as 
domestic worker. Her total salary of 1,300 Euros per month had led to the rejec-
tion of her application for family reunification with her son on the grounds that 
she did not comply with income requirements. In this case, the Tribunal held that 
the constitutional principles of protection of the family and of minor children de-
manded an extensive interpretation of this norm, whereby the applicant could rely 
on the income of her cohabiting adult children to comply with income require-
ments. Significantly, such a conclusion was prompted by a judicial consideration 
of Ms Laura’s family as “a fully organised and structured family unit with an actual 
rootedness in Spain”. 59 
Italian jurisprudence, on its part, offers an array of judicial interpretations of in-
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come requirements through a more or less conscious approach based on capabilities. 
First, Italian courts have granted access to family reunification to migrant women 
who exclusively performed unpaid care work within the household. Such judicial 
interpretations confirm the existence of a strict link between the capabilities ap-
proach and the relational understanding of the legal subject. While Italian courts did 
not explicitly face the issue of capabilities in these cases, they did choose to consider 
the involved applicants in the broader context of their family relationships. This an-
gle, in turn, turned the courts’ attention towards the meaning of such relationships 
vis-á-vis the applicants’ compliance with purely economic requirements. 
In Italy, higher and lower courts have carried out such judicial interpretations 
ever since 1995. In this year, the Italian Constitutional Court assessed the case of a 
Brazilian woman (Ms. De Castro Carvalho) whose application for family reunifica-
tion with her son had been rejected on the grounds of the fact that, “being a 
homemaker, she did not carry out any employed activity”. 60 The applicable norms 
at the time indeed granted the right to family reunification to “third-country na-
tional workers”. 61 The Constitutional Court assessed that the correct interpreta-
tion of this norm necessarily had to go beyond its literal text and consider the right 
to family reunification as also attributed to homemakers. Interestingly, this view 
was not simply grounded on the fundamental right to family life pursuant Arts. 29 
and 30 of the Constitution, but also on the state obligation to “protect work in all 
its forms and practices” established by its Art. 35. This interpretative choice 
stemmed from the observation that work performed within the family, due to its 
social and economic value and notwithstanding its peculiarities, came under the 
scope of “all forms of work” protected by Art. 35. Indeed, care work 
“is a kind of working activity which has already been recognised as of social and 
economic value, also because of the undeniable benefits that the entire community 
draws from it and at the same time of the burdens and responsibilities that derive from 
it and that even at present time almost exclusively weigh on women (also due to wide-
spread phenomena of unemployment)”. 62 
As a result, the Constitutional Court assimilated care work with employment 
for the purpose of family reunification, allowing Ms. De Castro Carvalho to access 
family reunification with her children. 
The commented Constitutional Court judgment also prompted a lower court – 
the Tribunal of Bologna – to reject as “unreasonable” a restrictive interpretation of 
domestic family reunification law excluding from its scope third-country national 
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homemakers with no personal income. In the Tribunal’s view, such an interpreta-
tion would be discriminatory, since 
“it would appear to be constitutionally illegitimate to allow family reunification with 
children to the foreign woman who works outside of the home and to deny it to the 
foreign woman who carries out her homemaker activity, granting practical and material 
support to entire families”. 63 
On a more general level, Italian jurisprudence offers plenty of examples of ho-
listic consideration of third-country nationals within the broader context of their 
families and of the host society. The described judicial approach has indeed ex-
panded beyond the family reunification realm, permeating areas such as access to 
citizenship and renewal of residence and work permits. Italian administrative tri-
bunals (TARs) have for instance established that the evaluation of the economic 
capacity of prospective citizens should also take into account other factors. Thus, 
for instance, the eventual income gained after the submission of their application 
must be considered, in the light of “the difficulties experienced by foreigners in 
finding an appropriate source of income in their first years of residence”. 64 Even 
more significantly, the Consiglio di Stato has reversed Italian authorities’ rejection 
of citizenship applications submitted by third-country national women on the 
grounds that they did not have an independent income. Such decisions were in-
deed deemed illegitimate in the light of Art. 35 of the Constitution, due to the au-
thorities’ failure to recognise unpaid care work as actual work. 65 Lastly, in respect 
to renewals of residence and work permits, the Consiglio di Stato has consistently 
established that applications for this purpose must be assessed in the light of the 
personal and family situation of the permit’s holder. 66 In its view, this contextual 
assessment is also demanded by Art. 8 ECHR. The adoption of this judicial angle 
has allowed the Consiglio to consider in this context not only the presence of chil-
dren and spouses on the national territory, but also the presence of cohabiting 
family members who contribute financially to the family’s well-being. 
Differently than in Italy and Spain, in the United Kingdom the possible dis-
criminatory effects of income requirements within family reunification law has 
been underexplored until recently. In the case of MM and R v. the Secretary of 
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State for the Home Department, 67 the England and Wales High Court was submit-
ted, among other issues, with two key questions. 68 Both relate to the £18,600 in-
come requirement imposed as a precondition to sponsor family reunification. 
First, one of the applicants – Ms. Javed, a British citizen of Pakistani origin – ar-
gued that as a British Asian woman, it was virtually impossible for her to satisfy the 
£18,600 threshold. Therefore, she argued that this income requirement was unjus-
tifiably discriminatory, referring to socio-economic data that showed how this 
group experiences significantly lower rates of pay and employment than men. Sec-
ond, two of the applicants (Ms. Javed and Mr MM, a Lebanese refugee) pointed 
out that the impossibility to rely on the incoming spouse’s earning potential in the 
UK was also discriminatory and unjustified. 
In respect to the first issue, the High Court held that the rules were not unlaw-
fully discriminatory in the light of Arts. 8 and 14 ECHR. While the disproportion-
ate impact of the economic threshold on certain categories of migrants – particu-
larly women – was acknowledged, 69 it was ultimately assessed that it would be 
“both impractical and inappropriate” to make provision for such a differential im-
pact in the law itself. On the other hand, the Court held that the impossibility to 
rely on the earning capacity of the admitted spouse for the first thirty months of 
residence in the UK was “both irrational and manifestly disproportionate in its 
impact on the ability for the spouses to live together”. 70 Incidentally, the Court 
noted that – although it had rejected the claim of gender discrimination – “the dis-
criminatory impact of the new rules would be significantly reduced if the earning 
capacity of the female sponsor’s spouse could be taken into account”. 71 
This High Court judgment was then overturned by the England and Wales 
Court of Appeal. 72 The latter confirmed the justified character of the indirect dis-
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crimination originating from the income threshold in the light of Art. 14 ECHR, 73 
but held that it was not appropriate for a court to make determinations with re-
spect to appropriate levels of income required to prospective sponsors. 74 It thus 
concluded that the High Court’s finding of incompatibility of the minimum in-
come requirements with Art. 8 ECHR was incorrect. It remains to be seen whether 
the Supreme Court – before which this case is currently pending 75 – will share this 
interpretation. 
The discussed case law conveys the crucial and topical character of the issue of 
proportionality of financial requirements imposed as a precondition to enjoy family 
life in the host country. In the search of an equitable balance of interests in this mat-
ter, Spanish, Italian and British courts have stumbled upon key questions for mi-
grant women’s equal access to family reunification. Such questions involve the value 
that law must assign to unpaid care work within the family, and whether the latter 
should be recognised with the same value and dignity of productive work for the 
purpose of accessing rights and entitlements in the host country. Another key issue 
that emerges from the examined case law concerns the weight that should be given 
to socio-economic constraints that affect the earning capacity of certain groups in 
the assessment of the proportionality of income requirements. In particular, the ob-
jective difficulties in this area experienced by immigrants, ethnic minorities, women 
and single parents have been repeatedly brought to domestic courts’ attention. 
All of these aspects suggest the benefits of adopting a capabilities approach in 
judicial interpretation. When the considered domestic courts analysed income re-
quirements through the lens of capability, the hurdles disproportionally experi-
enced by migrant women in complying with them came to the fore. As a result, 
obstacles related to care burdens, labour market segregation and pay gaps were 
included in their assessment of the proportionality of said requirements. As shown 
by the High Court judgment of M.M. and R., the latter did not always result in a 
recognition of the indirect discrimination stemming from income requirements. 
Nonetheless, at the very least it prompted judicial reflections on the possibility for 
extensive interpretations of family reunification legislation, so as to take into ac-
count structural disadvantage experienced by migrant women or women of immi-
grant origin. 
Remarkably, in Italy the judicial consideration of migrant women as individuals 
in context led also to a valorisation of their unpaid care work as a gateway to enjoy 
rights and entitlements generally dependent on compliance with financial re-
quirements. Differently than what occurred in the Haydarie case before the EC-
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tHR, whether or not such work was performed as a choice became then irrelevant. 
The state obligation to protect work in all its forms established by Art. 35 of the 
Italian Constitution was indeed interpreted as including reproductive and produc-
tive work alike within its scope of application. As a result, the contribution of the 
involved migrant women to the well-being of their families and of Italian society 
was seen not only as a “major moral ability” (to quote Nussbaum) 76 but also as di-
rectly relevant from a strictly legal point of view. 
7. Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has analysed the discriminatory effects of the male breadwinner 
model that is currently predominant in EU family migration law. Migrant women 
in Europe have emerged as doubly affected by such indirect discrimination – both 
as sponsored family members and as prospective sponsors. This chapter has main-
ly focused on the latter. It has unveiled how strict income requirements imposed as 
a precondition for the enjoyment of family life in the host country indirectly dis-
criminate against migrant women, because they fail to address common factors of 
structural disadvantage (such as labour market segregation, wage gap, and so 
forth). The low EU standards in this field allow for a great unevenness between 
Member States’ domestic legislation on the matter. Diverging solutions therefore 
exist at domestic level concerning the balance between the state interest to migra-
tion control and migrants’ interest to enjoy family life in the host country. 
This chapter has explored different judicial interpretations at ECtHR and do-
mestic level in order to understand which concept of sex equality is best equipped 
to ensure that such a balance of interest does not play out at the specific disad-
vantage of migrant women. On the one hand, it has discussed the limitations of the 
anti-stereotyping approach increasingly adopted by the ECtHR in respect to the 
goal of ensuring migrant women’s equal enjoyment of family life in the host coun-
try. The very recent opening of the ECtHR to the recognition of racial stereotypes 
in the Biao case 77 does not overshadow the evident double-standards underlying 
its jurisprudence concerning migrant women. The ECtHR’s case law on transna-
tional mothers (including the latest I.A.A. judgment) 78 does not simply reveal its 
difficulties in identifying instances of intersectional discrimination, but also shows 
how courts themselves can enforce discriminatory stereotypes. More broadly, the 
anti-stereotyping approach appears unequipped to effectively tackle instances of 
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substantive inequality such as those emerging from the cases of Haydarie 79 and 
Garib. 80 
On the other hand, an interpretation of equality as capability and of legal sub-
jects as relational has been observed to produce fruitful results at domestic level, 
particularly within Italian jurisprudence. Regardless of the consciousness of the 
adoption of such an approach, this perspective allowed migrant women’s specific 
difficulties and hurdles to emerge in judicial discourses, and thus unveiled the in-
directly discriminatory character of norms that overlook such burdens. This, in 
turn, supported extensive interpretations of applicable rules which protect the 
host State’s interest to preserve its social assistance system, without completely un-
dermining migrant women’s right to family life. In the Italian case, it is important 
to stress that the discussed interpretative processes often relied on constitutional 
rights (the right to family life under Arts. 29 and 30 of the Constitution, and most 
importantly the principle of protection of all forms of work under its Art. 35). 
At the same time, the discussed approach promotes a judicial valorisation of 
unpaid care work beyond outdated and unrealistic tropes on motherhood. It skips 
legal judgments on the quality of transnational mothering – whereby the very act 
of emigration is considered as a suspect denial of a specific, desirable type of ma-
ternal care. Instead, the focus on capabilities shines a light on the socio-economic 
importance of unpaid care work within the household for the family as well as the 
host society’s well-being. By doing so, this approach allows human rights to play a 
transformative role. It indeed turns an obstacle to compliance with legal prerequi-
sites for the purpose of family reunification – i.e., disproportionate care burdens – 
into a ground to successfully argue against strict and indirectly discriminatory eco-
nomic thresholds. 
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